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Abstract 
This study explores the malt barley value chain in Ethiopia with emphasis on value chain 
structure, integration and performance and their interactions. Data were gathered from 
individual chain members through qualitative interviews and analyzed according to 
definitions of concepts in the literature and their arrangements in our conceptual framework. 
We identified several fragmentations in the studied value chain structure which constrained 
chain’s performance by weakening its integration. The major causes of the fragmentation 
were  lack of value chain-thinking, opportunistic traders, weak cooperative organizations, 
poor information sharing, and less support from the malt factory and breweries to the 
upstream members of the chain. The conceptual framework was presented to guide future 
analysis, open managerial and policy dialogues and initiate questions for future research to 
identify new ways of linking small-scale farmers to large agro-processors in the Sub-Sahara 
Africa. 
Keywords: geographic dispersion, vertical/horizontal arrangement, information flows, 
transaction governance collaboration, commitment, coordination, joint decision making 
 
Introduction 
Value chain structure (VCS) refers to geographic dispersion of value chain members, their 
horizontal and vertical arrangements (Lambert and Cooper, 2000), the information flows (Wu 
Et al., 2004; Mungandi Et al., 2012) and transactions governance in the value chains (Stock 
Et al., 2000). Members’ geographic dispersion alludes to the distribution of members over a 
given area. Transaction governance refers to the control exercised by value chain members 
over other members during exchange transactions which ranges from a spot-market (with less 
control) to a hierarchy (with more control) and, hybrid governance with moderate control 
level in between the extremes (Gellynck and Molnár, 2009). Though the components of VCS 
are believed to influence that of value chain integration (VCI), it was not sufficiently studied 
yet (Slone Et al., 2007; Stock Et al., 2000).  
Value chain integration has become a prominent research area (Wu Et al., 2004) due to its 
importance in the conceptualization of the discipline of value chain management (Romano, 
2003). It refers to the spirit of collaboration among members (Cao and Zhang, 2010) and 
coordination of activities and decisions (Villena Et al., 2009) to accomplish common goals. 
The first step towards VCI, from a focal company point of view, is to work with immediate 
suppliers and customers closely. Once these are integrated with the focal member, it is easier 
for this member to work with its suppliers’ suppliers and customers’ customers (Lambert and 
Cooper, 2000).  
Value chain members have already recognized the importance of VCI to enhance value chain 
performance (VCP) and put consistent efforts towards it to achieve high performance 
outcomes (Stock Et al., 2000). However failure to put consistent efforts towards VCI affects 
not only the performance individual members, but also that of other members (Gellynck Et 
al., 2008; Lambert and Cooper, 2000) and hardly achieves competitive advantage (Dolan and 
Humphrey, 2000). Consequently, the impact of VCI on VCP is often hypothesized; previous 
empirical research shows that VCI is a cornerstone of VCP (Pagell, 2004; Villena Et al., 
2009). In the view of Awad and Nassar (2010), for instance high VCP leads to strong VCI, 
while Ho Et al. (2002) doubt the existence of positive relationship between VCI and VCP. As 
such, the relationship between VCI and VCP was not satisfactorily studied empirically which 
provides the knowledge gap for this study to fill.  
Based on the identified literature gaps and the needs to better integrate small-scale farmers to 
large agro-processors in the malt value chain (MBVC) in Ethiopia, the specific objectives of 
this study are to (i) explore VCS, VCI and VCP, (ii) analyze how components of VCS 
influence VCP through VCI, and (iii) formulate key propositions for further investigation. 
The study contributes to the conceptualization of the interactions among VCS, VCI and VCP 
and also towards the facilitation of commercialization processes of Ethiopian agriculture 
which was the main objective the NICHE ETH019 project.  
Conceptual framework 
In the past, the term “structure” was commonly used in organizational management literature 
to show the division of tasks, authorities and responsibilities or to express the unity of order 
or command within a single company (Pagell, 2004; Stock Et al., 2000). The use of the word 
in value chain context VCS is a recent phenomenon and refers to the geographic dispersion of 
members’ location, their horizontal and vertical arrangements, information flows, and the 
transaction governance (Stock Et al., 2000). On the other hand, VCI is considered as a new 
approach to overcome individual member’s failure in the overall value chain context (Bitzer, 
2012). It involves concepts of collaboration among members, coordination of activities across 
the value chain, members’ commitments towards common goals and joint decisions (Kwon 
and Suh, 2004; Min Et al., 2005). Past studies have employed different approaches to 
measure VCP (Stock Et al., 2000). Mostly, product quality, responsiveness, flexibility and 
efficiency have been used to measure VCP (Molnar, 2010). According to past studies, 
product quality refers to the purity of the product; flexibility indicates members’ capabilities 
to respond to changes; responsiveness measures members’ ability to deliver products to 
satisfy needs of customers within the shortest possible lead-time; and efficiency deals with 
the maximization of profit by keeping the costs of inputs as low as possible without 
compromising quality.  
In their study of enterprise logistics and chain structure,  Stock Et al. (2000) formulated a 
conceptual framework that fits VCS to VCI to improve VCP. Pagell (2004) used similar 
concepts to study factors that influence internal integration of functional units of a single 
firm. In her study on chain performance and relationships in the European traditional food 
sector, Molnar (2010) formulated a similar conceptual framework, but there was an overlap 
of concepts of VCS and VCI. Similarly, Ghosh and Fedorowicz (2008) formulated a 
conceptual framework that links value chain governance, integration and performance and 
that partially replicates the sequential relationships along VCS-VCI-VCP constructs. Based 
on these studies and intensive reviews of literature, a conceptual framework for this study 
was formulated, see Figure 1. 
Research methodology 
As suggested by Baxter and Jack (2008), a holistic qualitative case study approach was 
employed for this study. Maximum care was taken not to deny some of members the attention 
they deserve while more attention is given to other members, which is a common mistake in 
most case studies. This study was limited to MBVC in Ethiopia. We selected key informants 
for interviews from four purposively-selected districts in Arsi and West Arsi zones of Oromia 
state. The districts were selected based on area coverage and volume of surplus malt barley 
produced based on information obtained from the Assela malt factory (AMF). Tiyyo and 
Lemu-Bilbilo districts were taken from Arsi zone and Kofele and Shashemene districts from 
West Arsi Zone. The AMF and four breweries namely: Saint George, a full subsidiary of 
Society for Brassiere and Glaciers International Plc. (BGI); Meta, a full subsidiary of Diageo 
Plc and, Bedele and Harar both full subsidiaries of the Heineken NV were also included in 
the sample, see Figure 2. 
Primary data were collected mainly through qualitative interviews. Interview guides were 
prepared in advance to enhance data consistency and reliability . This approach helped us 
obtain more inclusive and conclusive information (Bastl Et al., 2012). During interviews, 
respondents were asked to explain what they know about the structure, integration and 
performance of the MBVC. More specifically, they were asked to identify members that 
participate in the MBVC, the roles of each members, their arrangement within and along 
chain tiers, the smoothness of information flows, the level of information quality, transaction 
governance, the strength of MBVC integration, the method of VCP measurement and the 
level of satisfaction with the currently obtained VCP outcomes and the like.. 
Sampling and data analysis 
A multistage sampling technique was employed to select districts and key informants from 
among members operating at various stages of the MBVC (Bastl Et al., 2012). In total, 76 
interviews were conducted of which 27 were with farmers; 13 with traders; 17 with 
cooperative staff, 5 with managers of AMF, 11 with managers of breweries, 2 with managers 
of the Ethiopian Seed Enterprise (ESE) and 1 was with the coordinator of the MBVC 
improvement project funded by the Self Help International, a non-governmental organization. 
The identities of the key informants were kept confidential. The interviews were conducted 
during June to August 2013 either in Afan Oromo or Amharic languages based on 
respondents’ preferences. All interviews were recorded, transcribed and synthesized. The 
durations of interviews ranged from 45 minutes to 2 hours. A deductive research approach 
whereby existing theories on value chain structure, integration and performance was 
employed to explore the same issues in the MBVC to come up with key researchable 
propositions. Though solicited from individual MBVC members, interview responses were 
put into a chain context during the analysis (Vieira and Traill, 2008). Thus, all responses were 
analyzed within the context of the MBVC to obtain clear picture about the structure, 
integration and performance of the chain. The interview responses were initially transcribed 
and then organized, and finally analyzed based on definitions of concepts and perspectives as 
outlined in the conceptual framework (Vieira and Traill, 2008), hence template analysis was 
employed (Bastl Et al., 2012). Eventually, a complete set of logical links were established 
among VCS, VCI, and VCP and crucial propositions formulated from logical links (Ellram, 
1996). Similar to the work of Mikkola (2008), with special attention given to contradicting 
views of members. 
Case description 
The MBVC encompasses millions of small-scale farmers, hundreds of traders and 
cooperatives, four breweries and a single malt factory as its key members. Though difficult to 
precisely describe small-scale farmers at the upstream tier of the chain, we adopted a 
definition provided by Brüntrup (1997). According to this scholar, these farmers are 
traditional peasants, resource poor, and users of less inputs and technologies. Though the 
agro-ecology of Ethiopia is highly suitable for malt barley production (Legesse Et al., 2007), 
farmers could not produce as much quantity and as good quality due to lack of or limited 
access to improved agricultural inputs, technologies, technical supports and or fair markets. 
The malt barley productivity and quality limitations accompanied by uncoordinated 
collection system strongly constrained the quantity and quality of local malt and breweries 
highly depend more on imported one. The demand for beer in Ethiopia is projected to grow at 
an estimated annual rate of 20% given the low per capita beer consumption of only 4 liters in 
contrast to that of neighboring Kenya whose per capita consumption of 12 liters. Population 
growth, increasing urbanization and raising personal incomes (Steen and Maijers, 2014) are 
major causes for the increasing consumption and demand of beer which in turn implicate the 
increase in demand for malt and malt barley. In order to meet the ever-increasing beer 
demand from local malt, breweries have already started to look for ways of strengthen 
MBVC integration to improve chain’s performance. 
MBVC mapping 
Before proceeding with the investigation of detailed structure, integration and performance of 
MBVC, we mapped the key members to show the different flows (material, information, 
financial, information, technology) as depicted in Figure 2. For this study, data (both 
interview and survey) were collected from members (boxes shaded with parallel diagonal 
lines while members in boxes shaded with dots were neither interviewed nor surveyed.  
Malt barley and malt production 
The amount of malt barley produced by farmers and procured by the malt factory, farm size, 
and the malt produced by the malt factory fluctuate though the magnitude of the fluctuations 
are not so significant over the period of 2007-2013, see Table 1. Production figures in the 
four studied districts are far greater than purchase figures reported by AMF over the same 
period. This shows the sufficiency of the malt barley produced in the study area to meet the 
total requirement of AMF if properly collected. However, a large part of malt barley is either 
consumed by farmers or goes through other competing channels (e.g. urban consumers or 
flour factories). As such, AMF’s demand is often not met. It was observed that the volume of 
malt barley procured and malt produced by AMF change along with the land-size of used for 
the production of same crop and the volume of production.  
Results and discussion 
The MBVC structure 
The recent entrance of multinational breweries such as Society for Brassiere and Glaciers 
International (BGI), Heineken NV, and Diageo Plc to the Ethiopian beer sector is a meteoric 
opportunity for the chain to develop on top of the recent rapid growth in the local beer 
market. However, there are several challenges related to chain’s structure that the new 
entrants should tackle together with other members. These multinationals are currently 
working towards meeting high targets of local malt sourcing. For instance, Heineken NV 
aspires to meet 60% of its malt requirement from local source by 2020 and has started to 
make some interventions at grassroots level to meet this target. Other breweries have similar 
targets in relation to local sourcing. 
In MBVC, millions of small-scale farmers produce less quantity and poor quality malt barley 
due to small land size, lack of proper inputs, use of traditional farming practices, and lack of 
specialization. Though cooperatives are known for effectively linking framers to big agro-
processing companies (Bijman Et al., 2010), those in study area are poorly organized and 
weak. They could not support the farmers on materials/information flows and technology 
dissemination (Vandeplas Et al., 2013). Moreover, they could not establish uniformity in malt 
barley quality by coordinating the activities of dispersedly located farmers. Similarly, Stock 
Et al. (2000) expressed that geographic dispersion of members’ location causes weak 
integration. According to our own field survey, farmers need to travel for 5:25 hours , on 
average, by car to reach the AMF due to long distance and poor transport facilities. 
Moreover, a farmer should be able to supply a minimum of 5 tons of malt barley per 
transaction if she/he opts for direct sales to the malt factory. Many farmers do not have the 
capacity to meet the minimum required supply per transaction and it is also difficult for them 
to supply in groups due to quality variations. Farmers have literally no option than to sell to 
traders at very low prices. In a similar vein, breweries are dispersedly located though one can 
still argue whether a disperse location of members weakens VCI. Hence, the following 
proposition needs further investigation. 
Proposition 1: The more disperse the geographic locations of value chain members, the 
weaker the chain’s integration. 
In this study,  like the study by Lambert and Cooper (2000), horizontal VCS refers to the 
number of triers that form the MBVC. It is what determines the length of the chain. Though 
farmers repeatedly implored the malt factory to establish collection centres in nearby towns 
to support direct sales, the economic feasibility of these centres has been doubtful to the 
factory. As indicated earlier, cooperatives are expected to play a key role in bridging farmers 
and AMF. Cooperatives failure to do so gave a space in the chain to opportunistic traders 
who reap higher benefits while adding no or little value. In the view of AMF managers, it is 
not a rational to establish collection centres given large number of dispersedly located small-
scale farmers. The factory also has no plan to establish such centres but would encourage 
farmers to directly supply at the factory’s gate or through cooperatives than through traders. 
Proposition 2: The longer the horizontal structure of the value chain, the weaker the chain’s 
integration. 
In the view of Lambert and Cooper (2000), vertical VCS refers to the number of members 
within each tier of the value chain. A chain might have a narrow vertical VCS with few 
members or a wide vertical VCS with many members in the same tier. The authors indicate 
that value chains with wide vertical VCS cannot easily be integrated end-to-end. Members of 
such value chains usually limit their scope of integration only to their immediate suppliers 
and customers and leave the tasks of integration with distant members to the immediate 
suppliers and customers. The engagement of million farmers in malt barley the production 
and hundreds of traders and cooperatives in collection form too wide vertical VCS at the 
upstream tiers of the MBVC. On the other hand, the fact that a single malt factory operates in 
the mid-stream of the chain forms too narrow vertical structure. 
A to the manager of Supply Chain Department of Heineken NV and a coordinator of the 
MBVC improvement project of the Self Help International, farmers’ expressed about the dire 
needs for improved seeds and better market for malt barley which cannot be met through 
isolated efforts of value chain members, rather through strong integration of the entire chain. 
With that conviction, Heineken NN has already started with some preliminary initiatives that 
would improve MBVC integration. 
The project called Community Revenue Enhancement through Agricultural Technology 
Extension (CREATE)  funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European 
Cooperative for Rural Development (EUCORD) is one of Heineken’s initiatives to improve 
malt barley production, productivity and distribution in collaboration with other local partners 
such as Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR) and Agricultural Transformation 
Agency (ATA). To this end, Heineken facilitated field trials of eight high yielding malt 
barley varieties brought from Europe at multiple sites in Ethiopia. Of the eight varieties, 
Traveler and Grace have performed well and received approval from the National Variety 
Releasing Committee (NVRC) for multiplication and distribution to farmers for wider 
production.  
However, the engagement of too many but small-scale farmers in the malt barley production 
has formed a wide tier, which makes transactions execution somehow difficult given the 
weak cooperatives and opportunistic traders operating in the chain. Past studies have also 
reflected the same view that transactions execution is difficult with wider chain tiers 
(Lambert and Cooper, 2000). 
Proposition 3: The wider the vertical structure of the value chain, the weaker the chain’s 
integration. 
The flow of information between members determines the level VCI (Mungandi Et al., 2012). 
The flow is said to be effective and efficient when  information with right quantity and 
quality is shared between value chain members at the lowest possible costs (Raynolds Et al., 
2009). But MBVC members, mostly famers at the upstream tier, have not yet understood the 
value of information as such. When farmers were asked about other members participating in 
the chain most of them do not know which members participate in distant tiers. Currently, 
farmers obtain more information from Development Agents (DAs) who are junior 
agriculturalists than from their chain partners. The malt factory frequently organizes training 
programs for model farmers on latest and best agricultural practices and technologies, and 
market linkages with the intention that these farmers would share the knowledge gained to 
other farmers. But knowledge sharing among farmers is a rare practice. In the view of the 
managers of the ESE, interactions between the two parties are not only less frequent, but also 
counterproductive. The factory’s managers do not agree with the opinion of the enterprise’s 
managers. In their view, ESE gives less emphasis to the multiplication and distribution of 
seeds of improved malt varieties compared to wheat. Otherwise, the malt factory works 
towards improving the malt barley quality through various innervations. Moreover, the 
enterprise lacks information on the efforts made by the factory. Obviously, information 
asymmetry hinders VCI. 
Proposition 4: The poorer the flow of information along the value chain, the weaker the 
chain’s integration. 
As mentioned earlier, making choice among governance mechanisms is challenging to value 
members (Gellynck and Molnár, 2009). The horizontal and vertical structures of the value 
chain determine the magnitude of such challenges (Lambert and Cooper, 2000). The fit 
between transaction governance and transaction circumstances such as members involved, 
level of trust, and distribution of power improves VCI. Stringent transaction governance 
frustrates value chain members and pressurizes them to leave than to encourage their active 
participation (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). Past studies highlights that the level of trust is a 
key governance mechanism that encourages value chain members to integrate their chain to 
avoid transactional risks (Mungandi Et al., 2012). When trust level is low, very stringent and 
costly quality monitoring measures are designed to control actions of other chain members 
(Kwon and Suh, 2004). In the view of interviewed farmers, for instance, the trust level 
between farmers and traders is very low. Similar finding was reported by Kambewa (2007) in 
her study on the Nile Perch value chain in which case traders collude to keep prices low. In 
the view of interviewed AMF’s managers, traders’ malfeasances has caused hostile working 
relationships  which in turn reduced VCP outcomes.  
By the virtue of low level of trust on traders, the malt factory undertakes strict quality control. 
Quality verification at the factory takes long time and entails higher costs. Traders have not 
option than to comply with quality control procedures set by the malt factory which is a 
monopsony. The traders are  dissatisfied with  unfriendly treatment of the malt factory. In 
traders’ view, the malt factory is irrational in blaming all traders for the act of opportunism 
though there are still traders committed to ethical standards.  
In the developed parts of the world, contact is another instrument widely used to facilitate  
transaction execution in agro-food chains (Mungandi Et al., 2012). In the view of the authors, 
contract somehow solves most of the problems of small-scale farmers such as lack of access 
to new technologies, inputs and markets, and price volatility. The authors explain the benefits 
that contract offers to large agro-food companies by enabling them control the delivery of the 
required inputs. During the 2012 planting season, Heineken NV started contract farming with 
4,500 farmers through it CREATE project and distributed seeds of two newly tested varieties, 
Traveler and Grace, and good results were obtained. The use of these varieties have doubled 
productivity and shown positive sign to strengthen VCI. In the view of the project 
coordinator, these seeds were distributed to farmers through existing cooperatives after 
revitalization, and or newly organized cooperatives, and or model farmers as it is easier to 
deal with these entities than with individual farmers. The ESE is a pioneer to start contract 
farming few years ago and promising results were obtained. Meta brewery has also started 
contract farming with about 10,000 farmers last year through viable cooperatives with the 
target of reaching 50,000 farmers by 2017 if the pilot project yields good results. 
Even though spot market is a widely used mode of transaction governance in developing 
countries (Vieira and Traill, 2008) its use in a pure form across the entire value chain is 
unlikely (Mikkola, 2008). Different forms of transaction governance are practiced at different 
links or mix of multiple forms could be used at some interfaces. 
Proposition 5: The less effective the governance mechanism at various interfaces in the value 
chain, the weaker the chain’s integration. 
Value chain integration 
In this study, VCI is conceptualized in terms of collaboration among members, coordination 
of activities across the value chain, commitments towards long-term relationships and 
readiness to make joint decisions. Though production managers of breweries and their 
counterparts in the malt factory meet regularly to discuss how to improve chain’s integration 
and performance, significant results were not obtained. Since recently, meteoric opportunities 
were opened up, uniquely for farmers following the entrance of multinational breweries. Prior 
to their entry, local breweries failed to recognize the strategic importance of local sourcing to 
strengthen VCI and raise VCP. Moreover, top managers of breweries by then were not 
experts of value chain management (Slone Et al., 2007). 
As pointed out earlier, members’ readiness to make joint decisions is one aspect of VCI (Min 
Et al., 2005). In the view of interviewed farmers, farmers do planning together with 
cooperatives. The Agricultural Growth Strategy of Ethiopia requires farmers to prepare 
annual plans with the help DAs to properly manage own farming business. These plans are 
shared with cooperatives for better alignment of activities. But, farmers and traders neither 
plan together nor share information on their plans. The malt factory does not involve other 
members in its planning and decision making process. Few years back, the malt factory 
established a research fund to which breweries also contribute to support the joint Malt 
Barley Seeds Development Research Project at Kulumsa Agricultural Research Center 
(KARC). The project could not deliver expected results due to high mobility of researchers 
and lack of proper monitoring.  
In the view of our key informants, collaboration among MBVC members and other 
stakeholders such as EIAR, ATA, agricultural research centers and seed enterprises on seed 
development is very poor irrespective of low productivity and poor quality of malt barley in 
the study area due to the use of outdated seeds. Most interviewed farmers could not 
understand the influence of malt barley quality on the quality of beer. As members in the 
upstream tier of the chain, farmers are expected to know the needs of other members so as to 
enhance the integration and performance of the chain. 
In the view of the Head of the Agribusiness Department at Meta-Diageo, the introduction of 
improved seeds alone can enhance the quantity and quality of malt barley production. The 
manager further hinted that there is high level of farmers’ frustration with current very low 
average productivity of 2 tons per hectare with poor quality. The use of improved seeds alone 
can double the productivity of malt barley. If the required volume and quality of malt are 
locally produced, breweries are relieved from the hassles that malt importation involves. 
In the MBVC, cooperatives are expected to catalyze the flows of information, materials, and 
technologies. But most cooperatives could not even negotiate with AMF on terms of sales 
leave alone to fulfill the higher expectations of farmers. Past studies, as well, indicate the 
same scenario whereby value chain members switch to other products when existing products 
do not pay off (Slone Et al., 2007). Cooperative organizations in the study area are weak to 
provide the required supports to farmers mainly due to the following reasons. Firstly, farmers 
have bitter memories of bad legacies that cooperatives left in the past. Secondly, cooperatives 
are managed by an elect member for his/her behavioral qualities than managerial skills, as 
combination is difficult to find in rural setting. Thirdly, cooperatives managers are not 
incentivized for serving. Fourthly, stiff competition from persuasive and flexible traders. 
Lastly, poor support provided by District Cooperative Promotion Offices.  
Even though breweries have the capacity to integrate with farmers through the malt factory, 
they rather pay more attention to the demand sides. They invest immense amount of their 
resources in promotion and distribution activities while these activities can be outsourced. 
The marketing divisions of breweries are well-organized than their procurement divisions. 
Breweries left the supply sides of the value chain to their suppliers. However, the concept of 
VCI has given considerable weight since the entrance of large multinational breweries.  
Proposition 6: The weaker the integration of the value chain, the lower the chain’s 
performance. 
As explained earlier, product quality, flexibility, responsiveness and efficiency are used to 
measure VCP in most past studies (Molnar, 2010). Performance measurement parameters and 
methods should be standardized across value chains to achieve stronger VCI and higher VCP 
outcomes (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2008).  In the MBVC, farmers measure performances 
from the point of views of goal achievement. However, majority of interviewed farmers are 
unhappy about the their achievements in terms of performance goals. Farmers do also 
measure performance in terms of product quality. In the view of the farmers, quality is the 
measure of grain moisture and purity, color and cleanness.. Responsiveness and flexibility are 
less used by farmers to measure performance. Lack of improved seeds and other agricultural 
inputs, non-responsive price to quality, absence of loans, information asymmetry, and low 
level of trust between value chain members are the major factors that constrain farmers’ 
performance.  
On the other hand, cooperatives staff measure performance in terms of their success in 
linking farmers to the downstream large agro-food processors to create sustainable and 
attractive market of malt barley. Cooperatives also measure their performance in terms of 
meeting the needs of farmers for agricultural inputs. The aggregate supply to AMF through 
cooperatives is less than 5% of the total factory’s local sourcing which indicates poor 
performance of cooperatives. The main causes for these are lack of flexibility of cooperatives 
to adjust prices in tandem with traders’ prices, low level of farmers’ participation due to low 
level of trust, limited capacity and working capital, poor managerial skills, and more 
concentration on input supply than malt barley marketing. The malt barley supplied through 
cooperatives are always of lower quality grades not because of opportunism as it is a case for 
traders but due to the inability of cooperative staff to differentiate malt barley varieties and 
qualities.  
Traders measure performance in terms of inventory turnover as they ration limited working 
capital among various agricultural crops. For traders, efficiency is the most critical 
performance indicator since they work under capital rationing. Moreover, traders wait longer 
to collect their receivables from malt barley sales on credit basis as the malt factory delays 
payment for couple of months which has a negative influence on their performance. Some 
traders also measure performance in terms of malt barley quality grades, in which case first 
grade implies best performance while last grade represents the least.  
According to the malt factory’s production manager, performance is measured in terms of the 
volume of malt produced and the quality standards adopted from European Brewery 
Convention (EBC). Malt quality is determined by the amount of extractable wort. 
Accordingly, local malt is with low level of wort mainly due to poor quality of local malt 
barley in terms of grain size, moisture level, protein content, and germination capacity. Since 
the malt factory uses world-class malting technologies, the poor quality of malt can be mainly 
attributed to the use of poor quality malt barley supplied from local sources.  
Even though all breweries are ISO certified for meeting the required performance standards, 
as indicated by respective production managers, still there is a long way to go. These 
breweries could not achieve as much as they should due to less quantity and poor quality of 
malt supplied from locally. Moreover, the malt is not available for just- on-time delivery due 
to weak coordination of activities as information exchange on production and distribution 
activities are very poor. 
Concluding comments 
This study paid a particular attention to value chain members’ geographic dispersion, their 
horizontal and vertical arrangements within and across tiers, the governance of transactions, 
the flows of information among members and how all these factors affect the performance of 
the MBVC by influencing its integration. We explored how farmers, cooperatives, traders, 
the malt factory and breweries are interconnected and how these interactions are governed at 
various interfaces and associated with MBVC integration and then performance. The study 
revealed that MBVC members are dispersedly located over wider geographic areas, wider-
vertical and longer-horizontal arrangements of these members within and across tiers, and the 
use of ineffective transaction governance mechanisms which contributed to weak integration 
and low performance of the MBVC though further investigation is required for better 
validation. 
The study identified variations among MBVC members in terms of the quantity and quality 
of information generated and shared with other chain members. The upstream members of the 
MBVC have less information and the situation improves as one moves down along the chain. 
The variation in the level of information generated mainly results from members’ variations 
in terms of capacity to generate information and access to information sources. For instance, 
farmers and cooperatives have less information than any other members due to limited 
information generating capacity and less access to information sources. Breweries and the 
malt factory are less willing to share information on product specifications to upstream 
members though it is quite useful for decision making. 
The study identified several fragmentations in the MBVC structure that have contributed to 
the weak integration and low performance of the chain. The quality of malt barley produced 
is far below the required standard. Cooperative organizations are poorly structured to make 
bulk collection of malt barley. Traders are extensively engaged in the adulteration of good 
quality malt barley with poor ones to serve their egoistic profit desires. The level of 
collaboration among members on malt barley seeds development is minimal. This study has 
provided a conceptual framework that can be replicated in other  similar studies with 
reference to agricultural value chains in developing countries for better generalizability of the 
findings. This study also provides important managerial insights concerning the structure, 
integration and performance of the MBVC. The disperse geographic locations of members, 
poor flows of information along the value chain, the use of ineffective transaction governance 
mechanism, weak cooperatives organizations, ineffective agricultural research system and 
absence of common platform for members  dialoging are some of the factors that contribute 
to weak integration and low performance of the MBVC that its members and stakeholders 
should work on to improve and sustain chain’s integration and performance. 
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Fig 1: Conceptual framework that associates VCS, VCI and VCP.  
Source: Own formulation based on (Ghosh and Fedorowicz, 2008; Molnar, 2010; Pagell, 
2004; Stock Et al., 2000)  
 
 
 * None governmental organizations working on malt-barleymalt barley improvements 
Source: Own construction based on our empirical data 
  Fig 32: MBVC Mmap of the Malt barley value chain   in Ethiopia 
 
Table 1.: Land use, maMalt-barleylt barley and malt productionproduction and procurement 
and malt production in the study area over the period 2009-2013.  
Year 
Case Districts Assela Malt Factory (AMF) 
Land used for malt- Malt-barleyMalt Malt- Malt 
Value Chain 
Structure (VCS) 
 Geographic 
dispersions 
 Horizontal/vertical 
arrangements of 
members  
 Information flows 
 Transaction 
governance 
 
Value chain 
Integration 
(VCI) 
 Collaboration 
 Commitments 
 Coordination 
 Joint decisions 
 
Value chain 
performance 
(VCP) 
 Product quality  
 Responsiveness 
 Flexibility 
 Efficiency 
 
 
 
Seed 
Enterprises 
Flour factories 
Customers  
(Food/feed) 
AMF Farmers 
NGOs* and 
private input 
suppliers 
Agricultural 
Input Supply 
Corporation 
(AISCo) 
Cooperative and 
unions 
Traders 
Breweries 
Material flows backward 
Information flows both ways 
Financial flows backward 
Flows of information, technology, and 
knowledge both ways 
Covered by the study 
Not covered  
Agricultural 
research 
centers 
Formázott: Betűtípus: Félkövér
Megjegyzés [JK1]: Caption needs to be 
more explicit 
Megjegyzés [JK2]: Caption needs to be 
more explcit 
barleymalt barley 
(hectares) 
barley production 
(tons) 
barleyMalt 
barley 
purchase 
(tons) 
production 
(tons) 
2009 20,390 59,131 21,704.69 16,819.60 
2010 17,439 45,341 23,718.70 11,526.30 
2011 19,602 54,886 34,861.51 22,595.05 
2012 19,316 48,290 20,244.29 25,727.73 
2013 24,374 65,810 27,820.70 20,724.30 
 Source: District offices of Agriculture and AMF 
 
 
 
 
